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Does the
California 
Energy Crisis 
Spell Trouble 
for Maine?
By David Flannigan
The California energy crisis has
drawn attention to a subject that average
consumers have, until now, largely
ignored: deregulation of electricity. While
a handful of states, including Maine, have
freed consumers to shop for their electrici-
ty, most people have continued taking 
service from their traditional supplier—
and rightfully so. Staying with their local
utility has typically meant stable—if not
declining—electric rates, although, of
course, we must expect some price volatil-
ity as fuel prices fluctuate. 
However, in California, the first state
to deregulate its electricity supplies, it
appears that something has gone terribly
wrong. Every day brings new stories of
power blackouts, skyrocketing rates, and
utilities on the verge of bankruptcy. Now
market competition could provide lower
prices and more service options than 
government regulation, the deregulation
movement has gathered steam as actual
experience has confirmed 
that belief. To date, in every
deregulated industry, prices
have come down and service
options have increased, often
dramatically. True, there have
been trade-offs (e.g., congest-
ed airports, less service in
remote areas, bothersome calls
from telemarketers), but on
balance, deregulation has been
seen as positive for air travel,
phone service, freight rates,
and other deregulated markets. 
In fact, electricity is the
last of the heavily regulated
markets to undergo deregula-
tion. We held off because of
concerns that electricity was
too complicated a service to
deregulate without affecting
reliability. Unlike other goods
and services, electricity must
be produced and consumed
simultaneously; it requires an
extraordinarily high degree 
of coordination in production
and to maintain reliability. 
there is talk that the nation’s economy
may begin to suffer if the California 
situation isn’t brought under control. 
If electric deregulation can have such
disastrous consequences in
California, what does that
mean for Maine? Will our
lights stay on? Will our
bills go through the roof?
For a number of reasons, 
I believe the prospects for
Maine can be very differ-
ent. Before examining
exactly why that is, it may
be useful to briefly retrace
our steps in opting to
deregulate in the first
place. 
Deregulation in
Maine, as in other states,
has its roots in two experi-
ences: 
First, beginning with
the airline industry some
twenty-five years ago, our
country (like many around
the world) has been active-
ly pursuing the elimination
of price and service regu-
lation from all regulated
industries. Originally
fueled by the belief that
Recent stories from California of power blackouts, utility bankruptcies, and skyrocketing rates
have left many wondering whether Maine is going to suffer a similar fate. After all, like
California, Maine has deregulated its electricity supply—an idea that sounded good to many,
but which now has some questioning whether consumers will be made better off or worse. To
address these issues, we asked six analysts to comment on electricity deregulation in Maine. Some
address whether Maine is destined to follow in California’s footsteps. Others question whether
regional decisionmaking entities, such as the New England Power Pool and the Independent
System Operator of New England, sufficiently represent the public interest. Still others address
whether there is a future role for public conservation programs. Together, they suggest we will
not befall the fate of California, but they also suggest that electricity deregulation in Maine may
bring its own troubles if we’re not attentive and forward-thinking today.   
C O M M E N T A R Y
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It was only when electric
deregulation was tried
and found workable in
other countries such as
England that California
and other states started
down the deregulation
path with their own elec-
tric utilities. 
The second experi-
ence contributing to the
interest in deregulating
electricity in Maine was
the unhappy history of
escalating supply costs
over the 1980s and early
1990s. With the support
of state regulators,
Maine’s utilities invested
in the Seabrook nuclear
plant, which experienced
huge cost overruns. Still,
even as the utilities were extricating them-
selves from that problem, the state was
embarking on its own policy of encour-
aging—with generous subsidies—the
building of cogeneration and renewable
energy plants. These and related develop-
ments produced a doubling of electricity
costs by the early 1990s. 
With this history, deregulation
received a warm welcome in Maine when
it was first proposed in 1995. While it
took a few years before the details of
comprehensive electricity deregulation
could be worked out and agreed to in 
the legislature, the concept enjoyed broad
support from the beginning. 
So, why is Maine unlikely to go the
way of California? Several factors seem 
to put us in a better position. First, Maine
draws its power from a region that has 
a much better balance of supply and
demand than California. Growth in
demand has been slower,
and growth in supply has
been faster. As to the latter,
some new power plants
have already come on line
(such as the Duke Energy
plant in Veazie), and others
are scheduled to be com-
pleted soon (the Westbrook
Calpine plant, for example). 
Second, Maine regula-
tions have taken care to
encourage the signing of
long-term power supply
contracts to ensure stable
rates for the bulk of Maine
consumers. In California,
by contrast, utilities have
purchased most of their
electricity on the more
volatile spot market. 
Third, Maine sits in 
a region of relatively small states and
power-rich Canadian provinces. There is a
regional history of cooperation to ensure
reliable electricity supplies, which may be
less pronounced than in the Pacific West. 
All of this is not to say that Maine is
guaranteed immunity from the kinds of
problems that California is experiencing.
Maine must remain vigilant to ensure that
power flows freely in the region, that new
generation and transmission is sited and
built when needed, and that remaining
market rules are fair to consumers and
producers alike. 
But to maximize our chances of
avoiding the kind of disaster California
has experienced, I believe Maine should
carefully compare the provisions of its law
and regulation to California’s to make cer-
tain we have addressed the problems they
have encountered. Some areas of concern
worthy of further evaluation include: 
1) Whether we have or can 
create adequate safeguards against
gaming by generators withholding
output from the marketplace until
prices are driven up; 
2) Whether we can create incen-
tives to encourage the development
of new transmission to make our
grid more robust and our markets
more available; 
3) Whether we can improve the
efficiency of the regional grid by
replacing the current bureaucratic
Independent System Operator with
a new organization based on a 
private-sector model; 
4) Whether the state govern-
ment can incorporate the expertise
and incentives of the private sector
into its future purchasing decisions
for “standard offer” energy supplies
for the vast majority of Maine 
consumers; 
5) Whether Maine has done 
all it can to eliminate unnecessary
regulatory costs in the marketing 
of competitive energy supplies so 
as to encourage the development 
of vigorous markets; and 
6) Whether we have made 
adequate arrangements to safeguard
the needs of low-income electricity
consumers in the event of sharp
price increases and established 
economically rational programs 
for demand-side management. 
Maine has already taken dramatic
steps toward restructuring its electricity
markets. To realize the greatest benefit
from this revolution, we should carefully
study the California example, avoid com-
Maine must
remain vigilant
to ensure that
power flows
freely in the
region, that new
generation and
transmission is
sited and built
when needed,
and that remain-
ing market rules
are fair…
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placency, and consider measures to further
improve on our new system. With contin-
ued sound leadership, I believe Maine’s
electricity outlook should be positive in
the long run.  
Are We Going 
to Meet the Same
Fate as California?
By Gordon L. Weil
Are we going to meet the same fate
as California? No, not if we continue to
stick to current policies. California made
several errors in developing the restruc-
tured electric market. We avoided most 
of them in Maine. 
To “sell” industry
restructuring, many states,
including California, thought
that showing a decrease in
electric rates just when they
introduced competition was
important. At the same time,
they ignored underlying 
factors, which were pushing
prices upward, with or with-
out the beginning of a com-
petitive power supply market. 
Maine legislators and
regulators took a more mod-
est and realistic approach.
Traditionally, regulators had
set prices in an attempt to
approximate the effects of
competition. Now, actual
competition would set
prices, at least that part
caused by the cost of
power itself (separate from
the cost of wires, high-
cost generation mandated
by the state and mistaken
generation decisions like
Seabrook, which continued
to be regulated). Maine did
not try to “sell” restructur-
ing by promising lower
prices, just better ones—
prices set by the operation
of the open market rather
than by regulators attempt-
ing to simulate the market. 
In fact, prices did go
up all over the United
States for reasons that have
little or nothing to do with
restructuring. For example,
OPEC raised oil prices from artificially
low levels of about $12 a barrel to more
than $34 a barrel. Naturally, the supply of
gas could not keep up with
the demand imposed by a
burgeoning economy; thus,
costs more than doubled. 
Demand rose steadily
in California, but no new
generation or transmission
was put in place to serve 
it. In New England, much
new generation has been
planned or added, although
the need for new trans-
mission is beginning to
become pressing. While 
we are far from the
California situation, the
need for new transmission
could begin to give us a
taste of their problems. 
California made two
more big errors. First, the
traditional electric utilities
remained responsible for
serving most customers
and their rates continue 
to be fully regulated. At
the same time, they were
forced to sell most of
their own generation.
Thus, if costs of power
supply from others went
up, as they did, the utili-
ties could not pass these
higher costs on to cus-
tomers. When costs rose 
to the point that they
topped what utilities could
charge, disaster struck. 
Second, the utilities
were not only required to
make most of their power
supply purchases in the short-term market
run by the California power exchange, 
but to pay short-term market prices. They
could not make long-term power supply
arrangements at fixed prices, so-called
bilateral arrangements. 
As a result, the major utilities faced 
a price squeeze, paying more for their
supply than they could collect from their
customers; thus, they faced bankruptcy.
Some critics charge that they syphoned
funds from utility operations to their other
businesses, which did not help. 
By contrast, only a small portion of
New England’s power supply is obtained
in the short-term market, with most deals
being longer-term bilaterals, many with
fixed prices. In Maine, utilities simply
pass along the cost of power supply,
which is obtained through competitive
bidding. Furthermore, as prices rose, the
Maine Public Utilities Commission (PUC)
Gordon L. Weil is chair-
man of Weil Consulting
Group, energy consultants
and power brokers in the
United States and Canada
specializing in power sup-
ply for large customers
and groups, and transmis-
sion operation and devel-
opment.
C O M M E N T A R Y
To “sell” indus-
try restructur-
ing, many states,
including
California,
thought that
showing a
decrease in 
electric rates
just when they
introduced 
competition 
was important.
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had far more flexibility (and foresight)
than its California counterpart in dealing
with them. 
Maine’s favorable comparison with
California should not lead to the conclu-
sion that all is well here. It is not. Both 
the New England Independent System
Operator (ISO) and Maine authorities have
created an excessively complex system, 
one that deters the entry of numerous
marketers and discourages the very com-
petitors we wanted to flock to serve us. 
New transmission cannot be built
because—after almost five years of try-
ing to apply reasonable congestion man-
agement rules, most a matter of deciding
who pays for relieving bottlenecks—
New England cannot agree. The hourly
power market is so complicated and
unreliable in sending price signals, 
generators have called for drastic reform.
In Maine, everything from the way the
PUC purchases standard-offer power 
to the requirement for a renewables 
component stifle competition. 
In New England, we need a better
decisionmaking apparatus than a hopeless-
ly inefficient New England Power Pool
and an ISO, which is responsible and
responsive to nobody. In Maine, we need
to better understand how the market actu-
ally works and that it is not, for example,
like telephone service. 
To be sure, because it is unlikely that
Maine will abandon its superior, if flawed,
system in favor of what has been done in
California, it is equally unlikely that we
will suffer the same fate. Our system is
still more firmly grounded than the
California dream, which turned out to be
a nightmare.  
Who Oversees the
Wholesale
Electricity Market
and Why You
Should Care
By Stephen L. Diamond
At 2 p.m. on May 8, 2000, the price
of one megawatt hour of electricity pur-
chased in the spot market serving the six
New England states hit the unprecedented
level of $6,000. The same amount of
electricity cost $30.62 exactly a week ear-
lier and $46.77 exactly a week later. 
What made May 8 such
a boon for sellers and such a
bust for buyers? According
to the Independent System
Operator of New England
(ISO-NE), the entity respon-
sible for keeping New
England’s lights on and
overseeing our spot market
for electricity, two factors
contributed to producing 
an unusually high level of
demand relative to the avail-
able supply. The first was
“record-breaking tempera-
tures that resulted in
extremely high loads.” The
second was that “several
large generators were late 
in returning from spring
maintenance.” 
With high temperatures of seventy-
seven degrees in Portland and seventy-five
degrees in Bangor, Maine was indeed
warmer than usual for early May, but not
of a magnitude that would cause wide-
spread cranking up of air conditioners.
However, there was substantially more
perspiration in Hartford, Connecticut,
which hit ninety-three degrees with high
humidity. On the supply side, although
ISO-NE has not disclosed which genera-
tors were late in returning from mainte-
nance, I do know that none were located
here. Thus, while Maine experienced a
comfortable day with no delayed returns
from maintenance, Bangor Hydro Electric,
in order to serve its standard-offer cus-
tomers, paid $6,000 per megawatt hour
from 2 p.m. to 6 p.m. in the spot market
for the power it needed. This forced the
Public Utilities Commission to raise its
standard-offer prices. 
May 8 did have a silver
lining for buyers (the lining
for the sellers was at least
gold and perhaps even plat-
inum) in that we did not lose
power. In contrast with
California, blackouts do not
seem to be in our foreseeable
future, except perhaps as
extremely rare events, a pre-
diction that I hope does not
link me with Irving Fisher,
the Yale economist who reas-
sured the country in mid-
September 1929 that stocks
had reached a “permanent
high plateau.”
According to ISO-NE,
the New England margin 
of generating capacity over
peak demand seems relative-
Stephen Diamond has 
been a member of the
Maine Public Utilities
Commission since October,
1998. He previously
served as legislative 
director for Senator Susan
Collins, administrator 
of the Maine Securities
Division, and as a deputy
attorney general for the
state of Maine. He resides
in Gardiner.
C O M M E N T A R Y
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ly comfortable and is projected to grow as
significant additional capacity is added in
the next few years, particularly in 2002
and 2003. There is an emerging concern
that, with virtually all of the new capacity
natural gas fired, our natural gas pipelines
might ultimately prove inadequate. This
could lead to electricity shortages, but
there are already signs that steps are being
taken to deal with this. Thus, May 8 is
not a signal that we will run out of elec-
tricity. The more relevant question is
whether we will run out of money to pay
for the electricity, which raises the issue 
of the health of our competitive markets. 
Maine devoted considerable time to
the design of its retail market, a process
that continues as we consider how to
structure standard-offer service so as not
to block the path of competitive suppliers.
However, if heat and humidity in Hartford
can drive up our prices, the message of
May 8 is that we need to focus far more
attention on the regional wholesale mar-
ket. The reality is that New England is a
single electricity market, as power can, for
the most part, be freely sold throughout
the region. Put differently, just as great
cooking cannot overcome spoiled food, 
if the regional wholesale price is high, 
no amount of competition in the in-state
retail market will bring it down. Thus, 
we have a major stake in ensuring that we
have a truly competitive wholesale market. 
Whether we can accomplish this
when state officials have no legal authori-
ty over the wholesale market, as it is
deemed to involve interstate commerce, 
is problematic. The challenge is enhanced
by the absence of regional government or,
alternatively, effective regional institutions
through which state governments have a
tradition of acting in concert. In short,
there is a serious question about the abili-
ty of state officials
to guarantee the
benefits of compe-
tition to those
Maine consumers
who have lost the
protection of
price-setting regu-
lation. 
While the
wholesale market
is under the ultimate control of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), that agency has not, except with
respect to a few pet issues, taken a partic-
ularly proactive role in overseeing the
development of the market, notwith-
standing the fact that it is still in the for-
mative stages. That effectively leaves
much of the control in the hands of two
institutions probably unfamiliar to most
Mainers: the New England Power Pool
(NEPOOL), which makes the market
rules; and ISO-NE, which administers
them. NEPOOL is essentially a self-regu-
latory organization comprising New
England “market participants,” which
includes generators, transmission owners,
marketers, public power entities (princi-
pally in Connecticut, Massachusetts, 
and Vermont), and end users. While 
consumers are part of the process, the
consumer voice in NEPOOL is over-
whelmingly that of large industrial users,
with minimal direct representation of the
mass of small customers—homeowners,
renters, and small businesses.
ISO-NE is a non-profit corporation
with a self-perpetuating board; its powers
and duties are set forth in a contract with
NEPOOL. Although it was designed with
an emphasis on its independence, as
reflected by the “I” in its name, its budget
is set by NEPOOL. 
Except for
their powers of
persuasion, state
policymakers have
no control over the
governance of the
wholesale market.
Not only does that
call into question
our ability to deliv-
er on our promise
of competition, but it also can limit the
effectiveness of our policy choices at the
local level. 
For example, consider the price at
which standard-offer or default service is
set. It is now taken as axiomatic that
California made a serious mistake in fix-
ing its retail prices in a way that allows
them to fall below the wholesale prices
at which the utilities secure the power,
thereby amassing a debt the people of
California will eventually have to pay
off—either in their taxes or their rates.
Maine has avoided this pitfall by setting
its standard-offer prices to reflect the cost
of the power obtained in the market. 
With our March 1, 2001 standard-
offer prices, we are now beginning to
experience the pain that can accompany
market-based prices. The consolation
should be that in a competitive market,
high prices ultimately lead to low prices
in that they cause customers to reduce
demand and generators to add capacity.
However, a problem with a regional
wholesale market and separate state retail
markets is the possibility of policies that
do not pull in the same direction. Unless
there is genuine market-based pricing in
other states, Maine’s high prices and
resulting conservation may not sufficiently
reduce demand in the regional market to
appreciably lower wholesale prices. Thus,
Except for their powers
of persuasion, state poli-
cymakers have no control
over the governance of
the wholesale market.
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we run the risk that our consumers may
experience high prices without the usual
benefit, namely, reduced demand sufficient
to bring prices down. 
My point, then, is that all roads lead
to the regional market. It was recently re-
ported that the president of the California
Public Utilities Commission expressed the
sentiment that they thought they had
deregulated the sale of electricity, only to
discover they had federalized it. From a
New England perspective, it may be that
with FERC’s largely laissez-faire approach,
we have essentially regionalized it. 
One might object to the above
notion on the theory that restructuring
means no regulation at any level. The real-
ity is different. In eliminating price regula-
tion, we took on the responsibility to
ensure our consumers a healthy competi-
tive market free from gaming by sellers.
This is no small task, as the possibilities
for gaming are substantial in a market for
a necessity that cannot be stored in large
quantities, that is delivered over a single
grid, and for which demand is largely
inelastic. However, it is a task that must be
ably and aggressively performed; indeed,
the one unforgivable sin would be to sub-
ject our consumers to an uncompetitive
electricity market without the protection
of price regulation. 
The issue for policymakers, then, is
whether we have the appropriate institu-
tions governing the regional market.
Should this authority be vested in a self-
regulatory “stakeholders” group and an
independent, non-profit corporation? Do
they sufficiently represent the public inter-
est, as well as the specific interests of
“small” consumers? Does the fact that they
must answer to a federal agency, even if
it is one that puts a high premium on self-
regulation, ensure sufficient public
accountability? 
I shall be content in this commentary
to raise the questions without answering
them, merely adding the observation that
FERC has made clear that it believes the
New England market is too small and that
we should eventually become part of a
larger Northeast market. If FERC’s vision
of the future comes to pass and control of
the market on which we ultimately depend
moves further from Maine, the question 
of who should be in charge is likely to
become even more important. To avoid the
California finger pointing, we should not
wait for a crisis to answer it. 
California and
Conservation:
Lessons for the
Present
By Stephen G. Ward
The ongoing debacle in California is,
in my opinion, a product of shortsighted-
ness in three major areas. First, California’s
utilities and regulators have failed to pro-
vide for sufficient new generating capacity
to keep up with high levels of demand.
Unlike Maine, where 1,500 kilowatts of
new supply have been added over the past
two years, California has seen no major
new power plant construction in a decade.
Second, on an annual basis since 1999,
California’s rate of sales growth for elec-
tricity has reached 18%, with very prob-
lematic results for the orderly use of the
transmission system. Levels of growth
such as these necessitate a literal doubling
of all existing generation capacity in less
than five years—an entirely unfeasible
undertaking. Finally, in a decision that, in
retrospect, resembles legislative malprac-
tice, the California legislature prohibited
their utilities
from buying
standard-
offer power
under long-
term, fixed-
price
contracts
with suppli-
ers, thus con-
signing
standard-
offer cus-
tomers to the
volatility of
the wholesale
spot market
for electricity.
With no
long-term
firm supply
prices avail-
able due to
this prohibi-
tion, cus-
tomers would
have been
entirely at the
mercy of the
spot market
were it not
for Public
Utilities
Commission
(PUC)-
approved
price caps. 
C O M M E N T A R Y
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Maine’s market does not
suffer from these ills. In con-
trast to California, Maine is
an example of a state where
the majority of residential
customers actually receive
measurable benefits from the
electric restructuring that
took place in March 2000.
In that month, rates for the
residential customers of the
state’s largest utility went
from 12.99¢ to 11.93¢, the
latter including a standard-
offer supply price of 4.09¢.
Additionally, because the
4.09¢ price was locked in by
contract for two years (to
February 28, 2002), residen-
tial customers in Central
Maine Power’s territory have
been exposed to none of the
upward shift in wholesale power prices
triggered this fall by higher natural gas
prices. As a result, Central Maine Power’s
residential customers have a very afford-
able electric price, locked in at 11.93¢
through February 2002, during a time
when wholesale power prices have ranged
from 4.5¢ to 6.5¢. This fixed contract
arrangement represents substantial savings, 
especially when compared with the fuel
clause regime that once passed wholesale
increases directly on to customers.
Compared with today’s supply cost at
6.5¢ per kilowatt-hour, this savings corre-
sponds to $18.00 each month for a typi-
cal residential customer in Central Maine
Power’s territory. Compared with today’s
wholesale price, customers in Maine
Public Service’s territory also have
received measurable savings. 
The case of Bangor Hydro’s prices
for its small customers before and after the
transition to retail
choice is more compli-
cated. As of March 1,
2000 residential rates
on average went down
2.5% due to reflection
of the proceeds from
the sale of the Bangor
Hydro’s assets to
Pennsylvania Power and
Light Energy Group.
However, these savings
were entirely eroded by
increases in the costs of
the standard-offer sup-
ply service that the PUC
approved during 2000,
so that today, residential
power from Bangor
Hydro has the unhappy
distinction of being the
most expensive in the
state (at 16.71 cents per kilowatt-hour
today compared with 14.22 cents per
kilowatt-hour in March 2000). For a typi-
cal residential customer using 750 kilo-
watts per month, this increase over the
past year comes to $18.70 more per
month. Due to Bangor Hydro’s merger
with a much larger and better financed
Canadian utility—Emera, a parent compa-
ny of Nova Scotia Power—there is some
hope that these high-power costs will
decline over the coming decade. In the
meantime the rationale for energy efficien-
cy and conservation investments is, if any-
thing, strengthened for Bangor Hydro’s
customers. 
Savings of the type enjoyed by
Central Maine Power’s and Maine Public
Service’s customers have not come at the
expense of competitive activity in Maine.
As of January 31, 69% of Central Maine
Power’s industrial customers and 68% of
Maine Public Service’s industrial cus-
tomers had contracted for their own elec-
tricity supply. In fact, at an estimated 30%
overall, Maine has the highest percentage
of electric load under competitive contract
of any state in the country. Currently,
thirty-five providers are licensed to pro-
vide supply, aggregation or brokering ser-
vices for electricity in Maine with more
firms being added to the PUC’s list each
month. Hence, with the significant excep-
tion of Bangor Hydro’s customers, most
other small and large customers in Maine
have benefited from customer choice as a
result of electric restructuring. 
Despite this promising start in Maine,
there are two sobering realities now con-
fronting us. The first is an area of similari-
ty with the California situation: an
inefficient wholesale power market whose
operations can too often be successfully
"gamed" by generators and power mar-
keters. Large players appear to have maxi-
mized their grasp of particular markets in
particular hours. Generally, it is clear that
wholesale markets continue to be imma-
ture, volatile and unpredictable in most
parts of the country and in New England. 
Still, it would be a mistake to look
for silver bullets like enhanced incentives
for generator construction or streamlined
environmental permitting. That is because
around the next corner looms distributed
generation with its potential for stranding
significant new investments in power
plants. Rather than a smorgasbord of
incentives for new generators, the better
idea is to support and strengthen demand
bidding and load response programs now
underway in regional wholesale markets.
Coupled with demand-reduction strategies
that lower wholesale market-clearing
prices and therefore benefit all consumers
of electricity, there is a major need for a
…at an estimat-
ed 30% overall,
Maine has the
highest percent-
age of electric
load under com-
petitive contract
of any state in
the country.
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renewed commitment to conservation
measures that benefit retail customers. The
kilowatt-hour that a customer never uses
due to conservation is the cheapest kilo-
watt-hour available. 
Because conservation investment has
dramatically slackened in recent years, a
renewed commitment is necessary. The
federal government’s funding of low-
income weatherization in Maine has
slumped from nearly $9.5 million in 1994
to $4.5 million in 1999. Central Maine
Power’s funding of ratepayer-based con-
servation initiatives has dropped from
more than $25 million in 1990 to about
$15 million today, all but $1,850,000 of
which is already committed in 2001 to
long-term contracts with Power Partners
programs at industrial locations. Funding
for new initiatives is exceedingly scarce in
Maine today, in contrast to Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Vermont and Rhode
Island—all of which have approved
ratepayer-funded conservation programs at
levels ranging from 2.1 to 3 mills per
kilowatt-hour. Maine law provides for a
maximum funding level of 1.5 mills per
kilowatt-hour ($.0015), but the sad fact is
that actual PUC-approved budgets are
much lower. It’s time to get past the short-
sighted focus on supply and generator
development issues and remember how
successful a national strategy conservation
was in trimming demand for energy gen-
erally, and electricity in particular, in the
1980s and early 1990s.  
Demand Side
Management in
Today’s Electricity
Market
By Kenneth Gordon
In the 1980s, Maine regulators—
along with their counterparts elsewhere—
developed a wide variety of so-called
Demand Side Management (DSM) pro-
grams that were paid for through overall
utility rates. The programs promoted
high-efficiency appliances and lighting,
better construction and insulation of
buildings and, on the industrial side, such
features as high-efficiency electric motors.
On another front, programs addressed
capacity savings by shifting demand to
off-peak hours. Further, interruptible
power service and peak pricing provided
additional options to utilities and to their
larger customers. 
Often underlying support for such
programs was the perception that there
was “market failure” in the DSM services
sector, limiting the efficiency potential of
DSM, as well as cutting off the environ-
mental benefits that were thought likely to
flow from its deployment. While there
were a handful of successful programs,
more often there was failure or ambiguity
(and high costs affecting rates). Moreover,
for most customers, most of the time,
prices were set at regulated levels that did
not necessarily reflect the value of energy
and capacity in the marketplace. Under
these circumstances, it is hard to conclude
that the market for DSM had failed—
indeed, it is at least as fair to say that the
DSM market was never really tried. 
By the early 1990s, in Maine and
many other parts of the country, the
attention of policymakers was shifting to
other approaches, such as introducing
competition in the generation and market-
ing of electric power as a means of low-
ering costs, and reliance on markets to
coordinate behavior on both the supply
and the demand side. For the first time it
was possible that there would be a mar-
ket-based price for electricity. 
During the mid-1990s the basic poli-
cy direction in much of the electric utility
industry,
including
Maine’s, shift-
ed from 
command-
and-control
regulation to
reliance on
wholesale
and retail
competi-
tion—even
allowing resi-
dential elec-
tricity
customers to
shop for ser-
vices them-
selves. Under
competition,
it was expect-
ed that sup-
pliers would
become more
efficient as
they compet-
ed for busi-
ness and that
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prices would be
lower than under
regulation. Just as
important, it was
expected that con-
fronting customers
with the true price of
electricity would
lead them to con-
serve when prices
rose and expand use
when prices fell. In
short, electricity would become more like
other goods people buy, and regulators
could step back from detailed rate regula-
tion and their extensive involvement in
supply planning, conservation and similar
utility-operated programs aimed at limit-
ing demand. Under the new framework,
managing the “demand side,” in response
to price, could become the job of con-
sumers. 
Under competition, the range of
opportunity for DSM is substantial, but to
fully realize its potential, it must be care-
fully dovetailed with specific customer cir-
cumstances. Good solutions are likely to
be situation-specific and even idiosyncrat-
ic; real needs must still be met. In the
words of DSM guru Arthur Rosenfeld,
the best conservation “doesn’t affect how
you live.” Only the customer can judge
whether that is true, and which tradeoffs
are acceptable. 
Examples of how to reduce power
consumption and/or costs abound. For
instance, consumers can switch from an
older refrigerator to a newer energy-effi-
cient refrigerator. For air-conditioning sav-
ings, a white roof can be installed in place
of a dark roof. Additional water heater
insulation can reduce costs. How cost-
effective such expenditures are—and
therefore how likely the consumer is to
make them—depends, in large part, on
the expected price
for electricity. 
The same is
true for commer-
cial and industrial
customers.
Indeed, in this
sector there is
likely to be an
even wider range
of technical
options. Many
may be able to improve industrial or simi-
lar processes, revise lighting and the like.
The use of time-of-day pricing and load-
sensitive meters can reveal to the customer
the cost and price of power as it is being
used. Rescheduling production (or other
non- time sensitive operations) may be
profitable, even if some cost is incurred by
doing so. Entering into interruptible con-
tracts in exchange for lower prices is one
longstanding example. Scheduling off-
peak hours for energy-intensive opera-
tions—such as wood grinding at a paper
mill—is another method that has been
used in Maine to save both capacity and
energy while benefiting customers.
Recently, as a result of the current
California shortages, an aluminum produc-
er ceased production in order to resell the
low-cost power it had under contract into
the much higher-priced marketplace. It
was only willing to do so because it rec-
ognized the opportunity cost—that is, the
price—of the power it would normally
have used itself. 
In light of this—and with due regard
to a history of regulatory-driven DSM
programs that can, at best, be described as
checkered—why are state-sponsored DSM
programs being reconsidered in California
(and possibly elsewhere) even as we turn
toward market mechanisms to guide ener-
gy use and production in electricity? One
reason is simply a failure to learn the
lessons of history. Ironically, the high
prices that led policymakers toward mar-
kets and competition came in no small
part from the excesses of a command-
and-control world that included detailed,
prescriptive DSM programs. A second fac-
tor is probably simple opportunism. The
current crisis is likely perceived as an
opening to reincarnate them for those
who never were reconciled to the decline
of the earlier programs, whether for envi-
ronmental or other reasons. 
In my view, a more fundamental rea-
son is rooted in the larger problem of
how the public views price in regard to
regulated utilities. When there is excess
demand, price could be raised to choke
off the excess—or perhaps demand could
be directly reduced without having to
raise prices. Avoiding a price increase will
often be the more politically popular
approach. Intertwined with this is the
problem of unrealized and unrealistic
expectations from restructuring and gener-
ation deregulation. Careful advocates of
electric competition predicted that as the
industry became more efficient over time
as a result of competition, prices—on
average—would be lower than they
would be under traditional regulation.
Less careful advocates predicted—and
perhaps most listeners heard—simply
“lower prices.” Their dismay at higher
prices is understandable, even though 
fixing prices at low levels is ultimately
highly counterproductive. The seemingly
sudden arrival of sharply higher whole-
sale electric prices in California has been
met with dismay and anger, recriminations
and blame shifting. Most discouragingly,
there has been a political reluctance to
allow wholesale prices to rise to market-
clearing levels (the cry for FERC price
caps), or, just as importantly, to allow
—why are state-spon-
sored DSM programs
being reconsidered . . .
even as we turn toward
market mechanisms to
guide energy use and
production in electricity?
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higher wholesale prices to be passed
along to retail customers, where the
demand and supply response might begin
to alleviate the shortage by encouraging
conservation and other forms of reduced
consumption. Of course, it is true that
California’s utility companies themselves
agreed to the price freeze that now has
them in such dire financial straits, but San
Diego Gas and Electric, which was freed
of that constraint by the terms of its
agreement, was recapped by the legislature
after it had raised prices. Small wonder
that the newly found customer interest 
in conservation evaporated forthwith. 
Policymakers must go back to the
basics. One cannot expect responses by
producers on the supply side and by cus-
tomers on the demand side; indeed, with-
out freely adjusting prices that reflect the
underlying reality of supply and demand,
one cannot expect to see an operating
market at all. Moreover, producers and 
customers alike base their behavior not on
momentary prices when making significant
investments in energy conservation or
other forms of DSM. Rather, they look 
to what might be called the “permanent”
price. However, if policymakers always
intervene when there is a move up in price,
doubts will be raised about whether there
really is a need to reduce usage—or add 
to supplies—and the shortages will persist.
Centrally planned DSM—or 
pleading for temporary reductions in
consumption—may meet politicians’
immediate needs by providing temporary
relief as people “pitch in” to meet the
crisis, but they are highly unlikely to
address the root causes of the problem.
Only when the critical role of price 
is recognized will the shortages be
addressed in the short- and intermediate-
terms—and will DSM find its proper
role over the long-term. 
Is There a Role 
for Further
Intervention 
in the Markets 
to Encourage
Conservation?
By Jim Connors
As Maine and most of New England
work to introduce competition into retail
electricity markets, new issues and con-
cerns arise over the assurance of adequate
supplies of electricity, the impacts of
uncontrolled price spikes, and general
worry over system reliability. The
California experience is seen as a warning
of how badly things might go in Maine. 
Conservation programs can help to
exacerbate some of the factors that con-
tribute to supply shortages, price volatility,
and the reliability of the Transmission and
Distribution (T&D) system. The conserva-
tion of electricity use, and improvements
in the efficient use of electricity, serve to
reduce the need for generation and trans-
portation capacity. They contribute to
reduced consumption and lower bills for
end-use consumers. A reduced demand for
electricity has the effect of increasing the
available supply at any given moment,
thus reducing demand-induced price
increases, which can be especially signifi-
cant during hours of peak use. Lower
peaking prices translates into lower aver-
age prices for all customers over annual
time spans and purchase contract periods.
Overall, energy conservation and
improved efficiency will help to alleviate
the potential for a “California experience”
in Maine. 
In restructuring the electric utility
industry in Maine, the legislature autho-
rized the development of a modest con-
servation program funded by a systems
benefit charge applied to all electricity
sales in the state. These conservation funds
are collected in rates by the T&D utility,
which are to be used for programs speci-
fied in a statewide program plan prepared
by the State Planning Office and
approved by the Public Utilities
Commission. Although the planning
process is not completed, it is clear that
opportunities for cost-effective invest-
ments in efficiency measures are much
greater than the amount of funds being
collected for the conservation program. 
Public intervention in energy-efficien-
cy markets is warranted when there is a
market failure—that is, when the competi-
tive market fails to yield desired or accept-
able results from a public policy or societal
point of view. A good example of this
can be seen in energy-efficiency markets
when consumers do not make investments
in cost-effective efficiency improvements
in the face of obvious benefits to them-
selves and to the system as a whole. 
In Maine and the region, competitive
markets at the retail or wholesale level
have yet to fully materialize. In a truly
competitive
market con-
sumers will
“see” real-
time price
signals in the
cost of their
electricity use,
and perhaps
be more
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motivated to invest in
energy conservation. It is
still early in the develop-
ment of competitive 
electricity markets in the
northeast, so it is uncertain
how active the market-
place will be in respond-
ing to opportunities for
investments in energy effi-
ciency. Public interventions
to encourage and support
conservation activities are
perhaps more critical in
the initial stages of market
development as a way to
bridge to a more active
private sector role. In the
meantime, market inter-
ventions in the form of
public conservation pro-
grams will help to stimu-
late activity in energy-efficiency
investments, and eventually lead to a
transformation of energy usage to a high-
er level of efficiency. 
Is there a role for further interven-
tion in the markets to encourage conser-
vation? In Maine, as new conservation
programs take effect, the benefits of
improved energy efficiency and energy
savings will help to dampen price spikes
and contribute to systems reliability.
Furthermore, improvements in individual
energy efficiency and the wise use of
electricity are demand-side responses 
that consumers have at their command to
moderate the impacts of supply shortages
and price increases. The more conserva-
tion measures put in place by consumers,
the greater the effect will be on factors
influencing electricity supply and
demand; such measures will help buffer
Maine from any future energy crisis. 
…public conser-
vation programs
will help to stim-
ulate activity in
energy-efficiency
investments, and
eventually lead
to a transforma-
tion of energy
usage to a high-
er level of effi-
ciency.
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